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IV.—THE ANTINOMY OF THOUGHT.
By ALEXANDER F. SHAND.
§ 1. Statement of the Problem. My object in the following
paper is to investigate an antinomy which infects all our
thought of reality that is not intuitive. We shall find it
hard to surrender either the thesis or antithesis which to-
gether constitute i t ; and any synthesis that would harmonise
its conflicting assertions seems impossible. I shall try to
show (1) what the antinomy is ; (2) what the solution of it
must be ; and (3) how, and why, it vexes our thought. The
final answer to the first question will only be reached after
we have seen the various forms which the antinomy as-
sumes in response to our attempted solutions of it. Our
answer to the second question will be the outcome of this
series of attempted solutions, each of which, through its fail-
ure, will bring us nearer to the true solution. The third
answer will be involved in the second ; for as the antinomy
does not belong to the reality affirmed, but to our thought,
so an adequate solution of it will be an exposure of the
different errors through which it infects our thought. I
shall investigate it in a common categorical judgment, and
leave the reader to apply this to other cases, as well as to
types of thought that are not categorical.
§ 2. First Statement of the Antinomy. Let us start from
the judgment, that some person A whom you do not now
perceive is in a place B which is also beyond your present
perception. When the judgment occurs, the image or re-
presentation of A is found localised in the image or repre-
sentation of B. We have first to realise that the judgment
transcends these images. For, when they are vivid, when
you see with the mind's eye this person in the place where
you suppose him to be, and are occupied with the images,
and do not analyse your thought, it seems that the images
themselves are the objects of your judgment, and that which
it is concerned about. You look at them as more than
images, as belonging to an external order to which you your-
self belong, just as you regard the perceived world as sub-
sisting apart from your perception. But this unthinking
outlook involves more than is apparent: for to think of
these images as belonging to an external order, you must
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judge them to subsist when you are not conscious of
them; and this would be hardly maintained on reflection.
If you did maintain it, you would still be carried beyond
the images. For, to think that anything is when you are
not conscious of it, you must represent it in your conscious-
ness, and (what is implied) know this to be a representation—
which is to judge that there really is an object corresponding
with it. This judgment is of the utmost importance, though
almost always overlooked; and we must realise that it can
never be reduced to images and their relations. We can
make in consciousness one image similar to another, and re-
gard one as the representation of the other. But in this
way we cannot possibly construct the judgment that the
one image represents what we are not conscious of. This
is only possible, where there is a judgment irreducible to
any group of images and their relations, which does not even
regard them as its objects, but which judges other objects
of which the individual judging is not conscious. It then
becomes possible, through this presupposed judgment, to
affirm that a group of images in consciousness represents
objects affirmed to be without.
Thus you have failed, and must always fail, to confine the
judgment ' A is in B ' to images in consciousness. It is,
indeed, only the images of A and B of which you are con-
scious ; but it is not the image of A which you affirm to be in
the image of B, but A and B themselves which you affirm to
be so related ; and of them you are not conscious. It is of no
matter here whether this judgment is true or. false; we are
only concerned to analyse what it undoubtedly judges.
I now pass to the statement of the antithesis. In judging
that A is in B, you are conscious of the judgment,—not
of any bare judgment, but just this concrete judgment that
A is in B. Now abstract A and B, and the judgment be-
comes a bare ' You judge' without there being anything
that you judge. Substitute C and T>, or E and F in place
of A and B, and you have a different judgment. You must,
therefore, be conscious of A and B, the objects of the judg-
ment, otherwise you would be conscious of a bare judgment,
or a different judgment, but not this concrete judgment that
A is in B. But you are not conscious of A and B : you have
affirmed, and must continue to affirm, that any A and B in
your consciousness is a mere representation, which this
judgment is not affirming, which it is not limited by, but
which its very essence is to transcend.
Thus you must judge, on the one side, that you are not
conscious of A and B, on the other, that you are,—that A
and B are in your judgment, and yet also outside of it.
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THE ANTINOMY OP THOUGHT. 359
§ 3. First attempted solution of the Antinomy. The
judgment ' A is in B ' is true or false. Suppose it false, in
the first instance, and so completely false that no objects A
and B exist to correspond with a and b, their images in
consciousness. None the less the judgment affirmed them—
affirmed A in a certain relation to B. You must then dis-
tinguish the affirmed A and the affirmed B from A and B,
the objects. The first are in the judgment, and contained
therefore in a reality in consciousness : the last in this case
have no reality; and you cannot confuse what is and is not.
And if the judgment ' A is in B ' is true, we must still main-
tain the distinction. For the affirmed A and the affirmed B are
in the judgment affirming them, but A and B the objects we
suppose are real outside of it. Thus we are no longer bound
to judge that the subject judging is conscious of A and B,
nor that A and B in the same sense are both in and outside
of the judgment. For the affirmed A and the affirmed
B are alone in the judgment; but if A and B the objects
are real, they are real outside of it.
§ 4. Second form of Antinomy. The failure of the first
solution may be shortly expressed if we symbolise the
affirmed A and the affirmed B by a and /9. For if all of
which the subject is conscious is the a and /3 in the judg-
ment, then this is all the subject judges in the judgment;
whereas if the subject judges about A and B, and not about
a and {2, then it is A and B of which the subject is conscious.
And the reason is, that if it is A and B I judge, then it is A
and B that gives the judgment its concrete character, or
makes it this judgment and not another—a judgment con-
cerned about A and B, and not about a and #. Hence it
follows that it is precisely A and B of which I am conscious,
inasmuch as I am conscious of this judgment; whereas if it
is a and /3 of which I am conscious in the judgment then it
is a and /8 which give the judgment its concrete character,
and therefore a and /8 which are judged. We will not accept
this alternative, and cannot escape from it: we are obliged to
reassert that the subject judges an A and B of which it is
not conscious and not an a and ft of which it is.
§ 5. The solution of the Antinomy must be through some
modification of the Antithesis. The thesis is that I am
unconscious of A and B, though I judge them. This I have
not tried to modify, for it is the very judgment we set out
to interpret; and if we denied its possibility, this would
involve the denial of all other judgments that unite with it
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in judging that of which the subject judging is not conscious.
Thus would disappear in theory our practical life which is
based on such judgments. We sought then to modify the
antithesis, that in thinking about A and B we unite them to
our thought and consciousness ; for its denial would destroy
no type of judgment, and so little is it bound up with our
practical life that it is in flagrant opposition to its presup-
positions, and the practical man would think it absurd. In
this course we shall continue.
§ 6. General statement of the Antinomy. The subject is
bound to judge both that it is confined to its thought and
consciousness, and that it transcends them. Yet this obliga-
tion cannot be fulfilled. The subject cannot unite in one
judgment these contradictory qualities, but falls a helpless
prey to each in successive states of its own existence. The
contradiction does not merely arise, as the German idealists
hold, from judging that anything is beyond thought in
general, but whenever the individual judges that anything is
beyond his thought at the moment of his thinking. For
when he judges, then what he judges his thought embraces.
§ 7. The sensuous meaning of the words, ' transcending,'
' outside of,' and the like. Now, since in the judgment 'A is
in B ' I am judging, not that the thoughts a and 0, and a and b
the representations, are related in a certain way, but that A
and B themselves are, we have to ask from the point of view
of the antithesis how this judgment is possible, seeing that
to make it possible I must go quite outside my thought and
consciousness. But, were I able to do this, would it help
me ? Could I travel to the place where I think that A and B
are, if they are, I should get an intuition of them. I could
not then affirm in presence of this intuition that they are,
though I am unconscious of them ; but if they are not, but
others instead of them, then I could not affirm that they
are in presence of this opposite intuition. Thus, could the
subject through its function of judging reach to where it
thinks A and B are, this judgment would still be impossible
to it. Only if consciousness is limited, but judgment not
limited by consciousness, is it possible for me to judge that
of which I am not conscious.
§ 8. Judgment need not be in ' contact' with its object, nor
' contain' it. If we now turn to criticise the thinking which
has led to this conclusion, and the question which started it,
we shall find that it has been dominated throughout by
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THE ANTINOMY OF THOUGHT. 361
metaphor, by the spatial meaning of these words,' transcend-
ing,' ' going outside of,' and the like. We supposed that, if
judgment could judge anything beyond the consciousness of
its subject, it must literally travel to that distant object,
till it came in contact with it. This was our implied reason
for seeking to send judgment beyond consciousness; for
since the latter was not in touch with its object, it seemed
obvious the former must be. We did not stop to ask our-
selves, how a thinking subject could be in contact with an
extended object. It did not occur to us that even the ex-
tended forms of which we are conscious in perception, we,
not being one of them, are not in contact with in the same
sense as they are with one another; that our contact with
them, when we strip the word of metaphor, means simply
that we are conscious of them. Why then should we seek
for judgment a contact with its object which, likewise from
• its very nature, is impossible ? Why did we not conclude,
that as in the one case we are conscious of the object
without physical contact, so in the other we judge the object
without such contact ?
There is then no difficulty in the way of judgment
because we as subjects are incapable of motion and
cannot go outside of consciousness to touch the object.
The only sense in which we go outside it or transcend
it, and that which leads to our use of these metaphorical
terms, is, simply, that we judge that of which we are not
conscious. But language is so penetrated by metaphor,
that the dismissal of an image from one set of words
leads often to its insertion in others. So it occurs to us,
that if our thought cannot transcend consciousness, we
must he confined to it. But just in the sense that we, as
thinkers, cannot get to the object beyond consciousness, we
cannot get to the object in it, and in the same sense that we
can get to the object in consciousness, we may get to the
object beyond it. Again, we say that, if we do not go out of
consciousness to reach the object we judge without it, then,
for the possibility of the judgment, there must be some emis-
sion from the object to consciousness, bringing its effect or
representation there. Now, what is brought into the visual
field we possess as an intuition, and if this intuition is all
we know, it destroys the possibility of the judgment which
judges without intuition of its object: but if we know more,,
if we know the intuition as an effect or representation, then
this knowledge is still concerned with something not in
consciousness, and would be impossible without this refer-
ence. But we repeat, and take denial as a palpable self-
2 i
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contradiction, that, if thought is separated from reality, the
one can have no dealings with the other. For to think
what is separate from our thought, we must unite it to our
thought, and contradict ourselves. And the clear sensuous
meaning of the words convinces us. We make no criticism
of the words, nor suspect that they present us with a wrong
relation of thought and reality, because the unextended
thought is transformed to an extended object. But, when
we rid ourselves of the metaphor, it is by no means clear
that we cannot think a reality separate from our thought of
i t : for it may not exist, and cannot then be brought into
contact with thought; and it may exist miles away, and yet
be thought of.
To answer this objection, we make use of the metaphors
of ' inside ' and ' outside '. ' In thinking reality the reality
is rather inside thought than in contact with it, and the
contradiction lies in thinking it outside : it is in the sphere
of thought, and not in the sphere of an external reality.'
If we ask why it must be inside thought, why thought must
be confined to its own nature and content, our answer falls
back on the old metaphor of contact: ' only within its own
sphere can thought be in contact with reality '
§ 9. The metaphor of 'contact' applied to the consciousness
of space. Under the influence of this metaphor it not only
seems impossible to us that thought can affirm an object not
in contact with the thought, but it suggests a corresponding
difficulty with regard to consciousness. I do not mean to
make any reference to the literal contact of the object with
the nervous system, but to that further and metaphorical
contact of it with thought and consciousness. Now I am
conscious of a complex of coloured forms in space. But
space, we think, has three magnitudes, and one of these
magnitudes runs away from me. I cannot obviously be in
contact with this distance. I can only be in contact with a
surface. Through my contact with this surface I become
conscious of it; but distance I am not in contact with, and
cannot, therefore, be conscious of. This surface is a magni-
tude. Am I then the same magnitude as it, or less, or
greater ? If less, then a part of this surface I cannot be in
contact with, and this part I must, in consistency, exclude
from consciousness. Of that surface only which is the
same magnitude as my subject, or less than it, can I be con-
scious. But as I am already a magnitude, and this is my
very nature, why seek, through my contact with another
magnitude, to explain how I come to possess that which I
2 4
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possess already, and which if I did not possess, I could not
have that contact which is supposed to give it me ?
But let us follow out the metaphor in another direction.
I am not conscious of distance; I only infer it. But I can-
not infer it, for I am not in contact with it. My judgment
cannot travel through space to the distant object, and if it
could, it would destroy the thought of distance. But let these
difficulties pass, and suppose that we do infer, and can only
infer, distance : let us compare this inferential knowledge of
space with that which we have by means of consciousness.
Now I am conscious of a variously coloured surface, and I
cannot be conscious of the different forms on it as lying at
different distances from me, because I am only conscious of
a surface ; and therefore all these forms I am conscious of as
lying on a surface, and not as lying some in front and some
behind the others. This is what my perception is, according
to the metaphor of contact; and now let us see what the
inference is. I judge that these very coloured forms, which
I know by consciousness to lie together on a surface, do not
lie together on a surface, but are at different distances from
me. Thus I contradict the intuitive knowledge I have of
them, which no knowledge can surpass in certainty, by a
mediate or inferred knowledge. Either then I am not
conscious of these forms as definitely on a surface, or, if I
am, I cannot affirm them to be what I am certainly conscious
they are not.
§ 10. The Antinomy need not base itself on the metaphors
'in' and 'out,' and 'contact'. There is a meaning not
sensuous in which we may use these words. We may mean
that A and B are in thought, and in union with it, as con-
stituents of its judgment. Then the thesis urges a threefold
objection. These supposed constituents are either a and b
the images, or the thoughts a and /3, or a commingling of both;
but neither one, nor the other, nor both, am I affirming. I
am affirming A and B the objects, which are not a present
intuition of mine, nor my thought about it, nor my thought
and intuition combined—a whole which is altogether in con-
sciousness. And it is certain too that if I put or find these
thoughts and images in a certain relation, they are in that
relation; but what is not certain is that an A and B of which
I have no intuition, and which may not even exist, are in that
relation in which I affirm them to be.
§ 11. Second attempted solution of the Antinomy. By
our criticism of metaphors we have only repeated and rein-
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forced the one-sided argument of the thesis, and exposed the
sensuous grounds on which the antithesis is apt to rest, but
it has other supports. We have shown that the thesis need not
be modified merely because the judgment cannot literally
transcend consciousness, and is separated from its object;—
that we might accept the thesis as true perhaps but for the
antithesis. Has this advanced our solution ? In this im-
portant respect: according to the thesis I am unconscious of
A. and B, and A and B are not in the judgment, though I am
conscious of judging that A is in B. This act of judging does
not require me to be in contact with A and B. It does not
presuppose the actual reality of A and B, which it must if there
is to be contact. On the contrary it only judges A and B to
have reality. The sole function of the subject in this judgment
lies in affirming A, in affirming B, and in affirming a certain
relation between them. This one function is the judgment.
This one function then is all that the subject is conscious of
in being conscious of the judgment. That is to say, the subject
is conscious of affirming A, but not of A ; is conscious of
affirming B, but not of B ; is conscious of affirming-a-certain-
relation-between-them, but not of this relation itself. For, if it
were conscious of A and B in affirming them, it would have
to confer on them reality, or presuppose it as given. Again,
because the subject is not conscious of A and B in the judg-
ment, it does not follow that it is only conscious of the bare
act of judging ; for it is conscious of this very concrete act
of judging-that-A-and-B-are-in-a-certain-relation. From
supposing separate (what are inseparable), the abstract act of
judging and what the subject judges, we falsely concluded
that the subject is conscious of A and B in being conscious
of the judgment, whereas it is only conscious of judging-
A-and-B. Judging that is not intuition is only judging, and
does not amount to any the least act of creation, or 'putting
forth ' of reality, which, as result of its act, would become
something separate. A and B are only thought to be:
whether they are, is a different matter not even affected by
thinking of them. And, as thought to be, they are in indis-
soluble unity with the act of thinking them, and nothing
separate or independent. Lastly we must make no mistake
on this point: for the very reason that no A and B are put
forth by the judgment, it is possible to be unconscious of A
and B, though judging them. For if A and B were a real
result, or a given datum, in the judgment, I could not but
be conscious of them in being conscious of the judgment.
Thus upon this subtle, but vitally important, distinction
depends our solution of the antinomy.
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§ 12. The main source of the Antinomy is foundin Language.
Our error has been a confusion, and language is at the
bottom of it. For the terms of its proposition are easily
separable, stand there as so many independent units, casu-
ally connected. Without being aware of any change of
standpoint, we suppose the same to be true of judgment.
The proposition, from its sensuous nature, attracts our
attention, but it is hard to make the judgment an object of
thought. So we transfer the qualities of one to the other.
Thus thinking by metaphor we lean on the proposition, as
if its linguistic expression was the judgment. Thus we use
metaphors as lights to see into the dark recesses of thought,
but which cast there their own images : and we are turned
aside from the truth by countless false questions and false
inferences.
We take A and B out of the proposition without difficulty,
holding up to consciousness two complete and separable
realities, behind which, in no very obvious connexion,
stands the act of judgment—another reality also complete in
itself; or we confuse the images a and b with the A and B
judged, which, like the images, are supposed actual, separable
from one another and from the act of judgment. This funda-
mental error rises afresh in a variety of forms, bringing
back upon us the antinomy; and it will continue to vex us
as long as thought is weak, and leans upon sense for clear-
ness.
§ 13. Third form of the Antinomy, and its solution. If the
judgment ' A is in B ' is true, a real A and B corresponds with
the judgment. There must then be an asserted A and B in
the judgment for the real A and B to correspond with, and
a, and /§ must stand in the same relation to one another as
A and B. Thus we are forced into the old error of breaking
up the unity of the judgment and finding a complete object
a and )S within the judgment, with the result that it must
be a and y3 that is judged, and not A and B (§ 4). The
way out of this metaphysical difficulty can only be hinted
at here. We take the transcendent judgment too abstract-
edly. Besides the act of judging A and B, there is another
act combined with it, very different from it. This is an act
of consciousness which has the images a and b for its objects.
Now, in the mere transcendent act of judging A and B,
there is nothing, perhaps, for the real A and B to correspond
with. But the whole act is something more than this trans-
cendent act; and it judges that the correspondence lies be-
2 \ *
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tween the images a and b in consciousness, and the A and
B that are transcendentally judged.
§ 14. Ambiguous meaning of ' what is judged' and
' object'. "We speak of ' judgment and its object,' or ' judg-
ing and what is judged '. ' What is judged,' the object,
means either the reality outside the judgment, or what is
judged, whether or not there happen to be this reality.
Now, though there must always be an object to a judgment,
in the sense that judgment cannot be arrested at the bare
act of judging but must be judging-about-something, there
needs not be an object in the other sense of a reality that cor-
responds to our representation of it.
§ 15. Fourth form of the Antinomy, and its solution. The
bare act of judging is not then sufficient to constitute a judg-
ment ; there must be a something judged to complete it and
give it concrete character. Through this distinction the
antinomy returns in a choice of alternatives, neither of which
can be accepted. For, either we affirm that the something
judged is outside the judgment, and then this external reality
cannot be contained in it; or we affirm that the something
judged is contained in it, and then it cannot be external.
But on neither alternative can we judge that what we judge
is external: in the first case, because the object is external,
and cannot be the something judged which belongs to the
judgment as the completion and concretion of its own act;
in the second case, because the object is this inalienable
property of the judgment, and is not external. "We repeat
our former solution, that neither A and B, nor objects in any
other sense, are contained in the judgment. Nor, as we struggle
to believe, does the judgment, in affirming-an-external-A-
and-B, fall into self-contradiction ; for this would only occur
if the reality of what it affirms were given to it, or created
by it. But this is no answer to the objection, that, if ' what is
judged' is contained in the judgment, it cannot be truly
judged to be external. "We may be deceived by the
metaphorical meaning of the word ' content'. Judgment
is no hollow cavity, rilled in its concrete existence with a
content, no particle of which is anywhere but within it. A
and B are rather of the judgment, and belonging to it, than
contained in it. But the difficulty is that A and B cannot
be external, for A and B are required to complete the
bare act of judging, and to give it concrete character. "We
repeat there is no contradiction in the judgment, till A and
B are taken out of their fluid and continuous state in it, and
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THE ANTINOMY OF THOUGHT. 367
hardened into realities, till the thinking-of-them is trans-
formed into existence. The thinking or affirming of them
is truly a judgment; but as existing, if they exist, they are
wholly external to the judgment.
§ 16. Fifth form of the Antinomy, and its solution. If the
A and B belonging to the judgment are no realities, but only
the thinking-of-them, then it is these thoughts that the
judgment is concerned about, and even if there are external
realities to correspond, they are not what the judgment judges.
Our solution is that this thinking-of-them is the judgment,
and this is not of course external, though it is a thinking-of-
^em-as-external.
§ 17. Sixth form of the Antinomy, and its consequence. The
antinomy reaches a climax in the form: ' them,' as a con-
stituent of the judgment, cannot be external, cannot be, what
you affirm it, an external reality. Let us suppose this con-
tention valid, and push it to its consequences. It follows that
A and B as constituents of the judgment are internal; and,
as they are in the judgment, they are no realities, but onty
the thinking-of-them. This is all that the judgment contains.
But this thinking of them is itself a judgment, and with
regard to it the same difnculty recurs as to the meaning of
' them,' which must receive the same answer, that ' them ' is
no reality, but only the thinking-of-it. What the judgment
contains is then the thinking-of-the-thinking-of-it. And we
are forced a step further towards absurdity. We must deal
with 'it ' as we dealt with ' them'; ' i t ' is no reality, but only
the thinking-of-it, and so on for ever. All that judgment
contains is the thinking-of-the-thinking-of-the-thinking. . . .
It can never become articulate, and struggles in vain to reach
beyond itself. It cannot judge external reality, and it judges
no other : it judges nothing at all. It seems to judge some-
thing contained in itself, which is not reality, but only a bare
and meaningless 'judging' over again. Even reduced to
this impossible abstraction, it cannot avoid self-contradiction.
It is bound to judge its objectless object, its bare act of
judging, as real in some way, as real in its thought, and so it
is led on again in a course to which there is no end.
But this absurd consequence is not a refutation of the
antinomy. As once before we were led into a defence of the
thesis, so here we have undertaken to expose the self-contra-
diction of the antithesis. But it is brought to contradiction
because it accepts, and cannot help accepting, the thesis; and
this is the very nature of the antinomy, that either side followed
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to its consequences refutes itself, because it is implicated with
the other side. The antinomy, however, is not answerable
for such consequences. Its true position is scepticism; its
function is destruction; it reiterates a persistent contradic-
tion. And we have failed to resolve this contradiction, to
explain how ' them' as a constituent of the judgment can be
judged to be external, and how the judgment can dispense
with this constituent without becoming a bare objectless act.
§ 18. The source of this form of the Antinomy lies in the
distinction of 'judging' from 'what is judged'. Once we
work on this distinction, 'what is judged' inevitably assumes
the form of reality. We deny that it is a fixed or completed
reality, only to affirm it as fluid or ' becoming'. We confuse
a judgment which contains no kind of reality save the
reality of its own act, with one that contains some image of
which we are conscious. And our solution has failed because
we are bound by a distinction which prevents a consistent
employment of it. When we forget the distinction, then the
solution applies, but the antinomy returns when we recall it.
§ 19. The nature of the distinction of ' judging' from
' what is judged'. We have seen that the phrase ' what is
judged ' is ambiguous, and I here put aside one meaning of
it. I am not going to consider the distinction of judging
from what is judged—the reality outside the judgment, but
that perplexing distinction within the judgment. Now, so
far as it holds at all, it only holds between different stages in
the development of a thought, and not between any statical
elements in a thought. Asking the meaning of a judgment,
we may seek to make our vague conception of it clearer by ask-
ing ' what it judges'. And we think it shows some advance
to be sure of this point only, that judgment must judge
something. Judging and a something judged are thus set
over against one another as fixed elements of the judgment,
whereas they are only successive stages of it. At first comes
the bare act, and then something more definite. As when
we look at a distant object, or one lost in any mist or
obscurity, and ask : What is it? feeling sure that it is no mere
object in general but an individual object; so with a like
expectation we question the judgment, and answer that
there must be a something judged. We are further led to
regard this difference as a constant one within the judgment,
by a habit of language. For language places an ' I am
judging* before what I judge. In the present case I am
judging that A is in B. I t seems, on the one hand, there
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THE ANTINOMY OF THOUGHT. 369
is an act or operation, on the other an object, as the Scottish
school express it. We have here a redundancy of phrase,
which has made us suppose a real elemental difference. We
need not prefix an ' I am judging'. ' A is in B ' is a complete
expression of the judgment, save that it does not refer the
judgment to me as its subject. ' A is in B,' then, is my act of
judging; it is also 'what is judged'. This act is no mere act
of judging, but the very concrete act that A is in B ; and ' A
is in B ' is what is judged. Thus if we rightly reflect on a
judgment we shall not find within it any such distinction of
' judging' from ' what is judged'; though there is a differ-
ence between the first vague thought of the act and the truer
and more definite one into which it passes, when the strange
out-going character of the act is recognised.
§ 20. The distinction of Thought from Beality. In a
similar fashion, we are apt to regard the relation of Thought
to Reality—the universal to the singular. First comes to the
thinker the indefinite and abstract, then, as progress is
made, the more concrete and definite ; and these moments
of thought are looked upon as necessary elements of the
' concrete universal'. Thought thinks reality, and there-
fore contains it and characterises it and makes it thought;
and thought is reality, for thought is nothing apart from
the reality to which it is united. Many are apt to prize
this result as indicating an advanced stage of philosophy
which has solved its hardest problem ; for in this act they
suppose they find the profound gulf between Thought and
Beality bridged by the wide-stretching span of thought.
We, on the other hand, have struggled to force reality out
of thought and the judgment, because any theory which
cannot do this inevitably fails to account for those funda-
mental types of judgment and thought which, though they
think reality, do not judge this reality to be within their
thought and the consciousness of their subject, but outside
of both.
§ 21. Judgment, in what sense a simple unity. Since there
is, within the judgment, no constant difference of ' judging'
from 'what is judged' it follows that 'judging' and 'what is
judged ' are not diverse elements from whose union the
judgment results. ' What is judged'—' A is in B '—is my
very act of judging. This my act of judging does not become
concrete from union with an element different from itself,
but is itself concrete. And my judgment is a simple act in
this respect, that it excludes all actual relation to its object,
24
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and to containing its object as a constituent. It is true that
consciousness contains its object; but it is not true of any
judgment so far as it is transcendent, that is, so far as it trans-
cends what the subject judging is conscious of. For, if A
and B are constituents of my judgment, A and B are
with it in consciousness. If external reality is an idea or
' universal,' the affirmation of it is a self-contradiction; but
in affirming external reality I am not affirming an idea, but a
reality, to be external. Neither the reality nor the relations
I affirm of it are in my thought, nor has my thought any
dealings with them, nor is my judgment constituted by their
union. It may seem as if, in the judgment ' A is in B,'
the relations of difference between A and B are in my thought,
not to speak of other relations. But this is not so. There
is only thejudging-of-&-&if£exence: there is no actual difference.
Whatever judgment we examine, and however much we
abstract from the complexity of its real object, we always
find this judging-of-an-object. We cannot get beneath this
act; we cannot resolve it into components. Though we
must use two such words to express it, as ' judging' and
' object', which for ever suggest a fundamental difference in
the judgment, yet judgment is no such complex of elements,
for it is itself an element. But in another sense the act of
judging is complex. When we do not regard it in the
abstract, but in its real occurrence, we find that its act is a
complex of different acts of judging, and that it also com-
bines with acts of consciousness, desire, and will. But abstract
from this complexity, isolate an act, look how it is concerned
about an object, then in this concernment it is altogether
simple.
§ 22. Sohition of the sixth form of the Antinomy. I
justify the theory of the simplicity of judgment as judgment
on this one ground, that it alone adequately solves the
antinomy. Whereas, if judgment be regarded as complex in
reference to its object, no solution of the antinomy is possible.
For, on this view, there is a factual relation in the judgment
between the act and its concrete object, and through this
concrete object entering the judgment as a constituent, the
judgment alone itself becomes concrete; thus it is im-
possible to affirm without contradiction that the object is
anywhere but where the judgment is. But inasmuch as
the act is simple in reference to its object, and A and B are
not in the judgment as constituents, I am not conscious of
A and B, though I am conscious of judging-them; and inas-
much as my act is concrete, because it judges these objects
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A and B, I am not conscious of an abstract and object-
less act.
§ 23. Other forms of the Antinomy are easy of solution.
'A is in B ' is a judgment; a judgment is an internal reality;
how then can it be two external realities in relation ? The
judgment is an internal reality, though it is judging-two-
external-realities. Again, since the act of judging contains
no reality but the reality of its act, it has nothing left to
judge but this act. This form of the antinomy is based on
the metaphor of contact. Now we have already seen that
this judgment is not confined to judging the reality of its
act, nor to anything in the consciousness of its subject, which
would destroy its possibility. How, indeed, it comes to pass
that I can judge a reality other than the reality of my judg-
ment ; how, further, it comes to pass that I am not even con-
fined to any reality of which I am conscious;—are questions
that we seek in vain to answer. "We do best to examine the
questions; and I have already sought to show that the sus-
picion they involve arises from our uncritical use of the
terms, ' confined,' ' transcending,' and the like, with the
consequent confusion of their pure meanings, as expressing
functions of judgment, with the literal and sensuous mean-
ings of the words. But we shall not attempt a positive
answer to these questions, if we know what we are about.
For how can we construct the knowledge which transcends
our judgment and consciousness out of elements which do
not presuppose the very knowledge to be constructed ? In
showing how it is possible for us to think a world beyond
our thought, we must always assume there is this world,
before setting out to explain how thought can reach it. We
must sweep away metaphors and the barren questions in
which they involve us, and recognise once for all that judg-
ment is one reality that judges another reality.
§ 24. The various sources of the Antinomy, and their
fundamental identity. At first, language betrayed us into
setting up as complete realities the A and B which, contained
in the proposition, seemed also contained in the judgment.
And, by discovering the true solution that this judgment
neither makes nor contains the reality which it judges, we
could not help falling back into the antinomy again and
again. For the fatal distinction of judgment and object,
' judging' and ' what is judged,' as a distinction somehow
within the judgment, bound us logically to it. Lastly, we
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had to rid ourselves of the error, implied in this distinction,
that judgment, as judgment, is a complex unity.
And the source of these various errors is the same in kind.
Thought strives to free itself from sense, and to think its
own nature without contradictions. But metaphor, and the
secret habits of language, are graven upon thought, and have
there written vain questions, and false doctrines. Thought
asks how it can pass outside of itself, and the metaphors of
' outside' and 'contact' destroy its hopes. In despair it seeks
to confine itself to consciousness, to its immediate know-
ledge. What then is the meaning of its doubts : why does
it question, suppose, take disjunctive and problematic forms,
when all is certain there, and contained in intuition ? Or,
it falls a prey to the sensuous symbolism of itself in language.
It discovers in the proposition the subject, predicate and
copula. It analyses judgment into diverse elements. It
succumbs to the habit of language, placing a redundant act
of judging before the judgment: it supposes a fundamental
difference. Thus the fictitious clearness which sense holds
out, and the ancient associations which bind thought to it,
deceive thought as to its own nature. And the fundamental
error which runs through all the other errors is this:—the
confusion of the judgment with the consciousness or intui-
tion of reality.
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